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I. INTRODUCTION "
Arnold's panicked hand quickly dials "911," he exclaims "Oh my
God! Brenda is after me with a gun" and then hangs up. When the
police arrive, Brenda is dead. The police charge Arnold with murder
and he pleads self defense.
Arnold's statement constitutes hearsay because it is "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."'
Hearsay statements are inadmissible2 unless they fall under an exception
or exemption to the hearsay rule At trial, Arnold's attorney seeks to
have the above statement admitted in evidence under the excited utter-
1. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible except as provided
by the rules of evidence.
3. Rules 801, 803 and 804 provide numerous exceptions to and exemptions from the hearsay
rule.
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ance 4 or then existing state of mind 5 exceptions to the hearsay rule. The
prosecutor's principal contention for inadmissibility is that the statement
lacks trustworthiness because Arnold had a motive to fabricate the
statement.
Unlike other hearsay exceptions, such as those concerning business
records and public records, Rule 803(3) contains no provision for a
judge to exclude hearsay statements based on lack of trustworthiness.6
Rule 803(3) constitutes an exception from the rule against hearsay state-
ments of present mental or emotional states of mind. The Model
Code's 7 provision for mental or emotional states of mind, on which the
Federal Rules of Evidence are based, does permit the denial of admissi-
bility based on a lack of trustworthiness or "bad faith."' 8 Although the
Federal Rules of Evidence are based on the Model Code, the Advisory
Committee, in drafting Rule 803(3), purposefully omitted the "bad faith"
provision because it believed that "good or bad faith essentially bears
upon credibility and is a matter for the jury., 9
A conflict exists in the federal courts over whether Rule 803(3)
may be used to exclude self-serving statements. At least one court has
used Rule 403 to exclude "bad faith" statements.10 Others use a three-
prong test, which includes a "bad faith" component, when applying Rule
803(3).1 Still other courts refuse to allow exclusion simply because
after the application of Rule 803(3) the judge does not believe the
declarant.12 These courts allow "bad faith" statements to be weighed as
a matter of credibility 3 by the jury in its fact-finding deliberations.'
4
This comment contends that statements like Arnold's should
4. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) and similar state rules of evidence except excited
utterances from the rule against hearsay. See infra notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
5. A then existing state of mind is excepted from the rule against hearsay under Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(3) and similar state rules. See infra notes 121-208 and accompanying text.
6. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 803(3)[1], at 803-105 (1992). The
hearsay exceptions for business records and public records, however, explicitly include a
provision for lack of trustworthiness. FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (7) & (8).
7. The American Law Institute promulgated The Model Code of Evidence on May 15, 1942.
Some of the most distinguished legal scholars including John H. Wigmore, acting as chief
consultant, offered guidance to the American Law Institute in its endeavor.
8. 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 6 803(3)[04], at 803-121. The terms "lack of
trustworthiness" and "bad faith" have the same meaning and are used interchangeably throughout
this comment.
9. Id.
10. United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1265 (9th Cir. 1989).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 142-193.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 201-207.
13. The fact that the statement was made in "bad faith" may be brought out by cross-
examination of the in-court witness, by examination of a witness who has personal knowledge of
the "bad faith," or by counsel in his opening or closing arguments.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 201-207.
[Vol. 48:481
BAD FAITH
always be admitted and weighed by the jury in its fact-finding delibera-
tions. In evaluating Rules 803(6) and 803(8), this comment will demon-
strate how "bad faith" has been used in the business and public records
context. Next, this comment probes the excited utterance and present
state of mind exceptions to the hearsay rule to determine: (1) the possi-
ble origins of "bad faith" analysis; (2) the factual situations in which
courts have used "bad faith" analysis; (3) what conduct constitutes "bad
faith" categorically; (4) the difficulties in applying "bad faith" analysis
even when a hearsay exception has strong policy considerations; and (5)
possible solutions that would further the interests of judicial integrity,
uniformity, and consistency in the decision making process.
This Comment focuses on Rule 803(3) to demonstrate that without
the subterfuge of application of underlying policy considerations which
allow "bad faith" analysis to take place under the guise of the applica-
tion of legitimate policy concerns textually described in the rules, "bad
faith" analysis becomes clearly improper. This covert "bad faith" analy-
sis is most clearly demonstrated when the strong policy considerations
of Rule 803(2) are extended to Rule 803(3) in the application of the
three-prong Ponticelli test discussed infra. Several states have amended
Rule 803(3) when adopting it to include a "bad faith" provision to avoid
confusion over whether trial courts have discretion to exclude statements
based on "bad faith". 5 In the absence of such an amendment, however,
courts should give effect to the plain meaning of Rule 803(3).16
II. RULE 803(6) AND LACK OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
Counsel may examine an in-court witness testifying regarding first
hand knowledge on each of four factors: (1) perception, (2) recordation
and recollection, (3) narration, and (4) sincerity. 7 When the in-court
witness is testifying to an out-of-court statement, however, the risks are
doubled.'I First, the declarant must perceive an event, record and recol-
lect it, and narrate it with sincerity. Next, the in-court witness must do
the same, except the event that he perceives is the declarant's state-
ment.19 Sometimes the declarant is the in-court witness. If, however,
15. See FLA. STAT. ch. 90.803(3) (1992); KAN. STAT ANN. § 60-460(I) (1992); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1252 (West 1993).
16. NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 46.01 (5th ed. 1992).
17. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.1, 704 (3rd ed. 1991).
But see 2 KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (4th ed. 1992) (stating
that sincerity is only one aspect of the other three elements).
18. For a simplified pictorial explanation of the risks of hearsay statements, see MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 64 (Rev. 2d ed. 1989).
19. At the outset, any finding that an in court declarant is exhibiting "bad faith", and therefore
the statement itself is inadmissible, must be rejected. In In re Marriage of L.R., 559 N.E.2d 779
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 567 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. 1991), a mother accused a father of
1993]
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the declarant is unavailable, opposing counsel will not have the opportu-
nity to cross-examine the declarant on the four factors. Thus, the
defendant will not have the opportunity to confront a witness against
him.
Before an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted can be admitted into evidence, the statement must have
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.2" The Federal Rules of
Evidence use a categorical approach to define which statements possess
such guarantees. For example, Rule 804(b)(2) excepts from the hearsay
rule statements made by a person under the belief of their impending
death, because of the belief that no one wishes to die with a lie on their
lips. 21
The Advisory Committee22 has determined which situations give
rise to statements that qualify as reliable hearsay. Rather than admitting
or excluding all hearsay or allowing judges to perform some type of ad
hoc balancing test to determine reliability, the Advisory Committee's
notes to the Rules specify the criteria which must be met. The Advisory
Committee balances the circumstantial trustworthiness of a particular
type of statement against the opposing party's need to cross-examine the
declarant to determine whether an exception to the hearsay rule is
needed.23 When considering some of the hearsay rule exceptions the
sexually abusing the parties' minor child and sought to have his visitation rights terminated. Id.
The mother and grandmother both testified that the child told them that she had been sexually
abused by her father. Id. at 781-83. The appellate court overruled the trial court's admission of
the statement. Id. at 787. The appellate court stated that the mother's motive to deny the father's
visitation was too strong to allow admission of the statement. This approach removes the fact
finding role of the jury and determines credibility itself. Note that if the trial court had admitted
the statement and simply stated that, as the finder of fact in a non-jury case, it either did not
believe that the statement was made or that it should be given very little weight to it because the
statement was not corroborated, that would be acceptable.
20. GRAHAM, supra note 17 § 803.0.
21. Id. at § 804.2.; FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
22. The creation of the Advisory Committee and the creation and eventual adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence were summarized by the late Professor Edward W. Cleary, Reporter to
the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Chief Justice Warren in 1965 appointed an advisory committee to draft rules of
evidence for the federal courts. The committee's Preliminary Draft was published
and circulated for comment in 1969. 46 F.R.D. 161. A Revised Draft was circulated
in 1971. 51 F.R.D. 315. In 1972, the Supreme Court prescribed Federal Rules of
Evidence, to be effective July 1, 1973. 56 F.R.D. 183. Justice Douglas dissented.
Pursuant to the various enabling acts, Chief Justice Burger transmitted the rules to
the Congress, which suspended the rules pending further study by the Congress.
P.L. 93-12. After extensive study, the Congress enacted the rules into law with
various amendments, to become effective July 1, 1975. P.L. 93-595, approved
January 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1926.
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE III (West Publishing, 1992).
23. Professor Laughlin stated the policy as follows: "[A]ny exception must be predicated
upon a basis for reliability to offset the injury to probative value resulting from the lack of an oath
[Vol. 48:481
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Advisory Committee decided that judicial discretion was necessary to
deal with all of the possible situations which may arise and therefore
created an open-ended "bad faith" provision in some of the hearsay rule
exceptions.24
Rule 803(6) contains such an open-ended "bad faith" provision.
Rule 803(6) provides that records of regularly conducted business activ-
ity are excluded from the rule against hearsay. 25 The policy behind Rule
803(6) is that business records "cannot fulfill the function of aiding the
proper transaction of business unless accurate."26 The systematic check-
ing of these records and the business duty make business records
reliable.27
A. Procedural Aspects of Exclusion Analysis Under Rule 803(6)
Business records may be excluded if circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness. The business record may be untrustworthy on its face
or it may be untrustworthy because of motivational problems.
2
1
Relevant case law reveals two ways in which business records may
be excluded as untrustworthy based on motivational considerations.29
First, Rule 803(6) lists the categorical requirements of trustworthiness.
The business record exception requires that the witness who provides the
foundation for admission must testify that: (1) the declarant in the
records had knowledge to make accurate statements; (2) the declarant
recorded the statements contemporaneously with the actions which were
the subject of the reports; (3) the declarant made the records in the regu-
and of cross examination." Charles V. Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 IOWA L. REV.
276 (1960). Not all hearsay is equally trustworthy. It is difficult to compare different types of
hearsay and find similar components. See Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 957 (1974) (attempting to make a synthesizing comparison of the hearsay exceptions).
24. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's notes.
25. Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made
at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EvID. 803(6) (emphasis added).
26. GRAHAM, supra note 17 § 803.6 at 867.
27. Id.
28. Id. at § 803.6 at 871. This article addresses only the motivational aspects of
trustworthiness analysis.
29. Although either analysis yields is the same result, the reader of cases involves excluded
hearsay under Rule 803(6) must be aware of the distinction between the two modes of analysis to
understand the more subtle application of "bad faith" analysis under the "not created in the regular
course of business" exclusion.
1993]
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lar course of the business activity; and (4) such records were regularly
kept by the business.3 ° One way to exclude business records using "bad
faith" analysis is to find that they do not fall within the legal definition
of "created in the regular course of business," because ordinary business
documents are not guided by purely self-motivating concerns, but rather
by a business duty or a need to keep accurate records. In other words,
the records do not meet the categorical requirements.
Applying a general overall requirement of trustworthiness is
another way to exclude business records based on "bad faith." For
example, the United States Supreme Court has routinely considered doc-
uments prepared in anticipation of litigation to lack trustworthiness. 3'
The difference between excluding hearsay based on the categorical
requirements using "bad faith" or based on the overall trustworthiness
requirement is one of semantics. In Solomon v. Shuell,32 the Michigan
Supreme Court identified this distinction by comparing the Second Cir-
cuit and Supreme Court decisions in Palmer v. Hoffman.33 Although
both reached the same conclusion, it was reached on slightly different
grounds. In Hoffman, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of a
deceased railroad engineer's accident report on the ground that the regu-
lar course of railroading did not include writing accident reports. 34 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals had taken a slightly different view,
finding that the document was inadmissible because of the declarant's
powerful motive to misrepresent.35
A minor technical distinction differentiates whether the document
is said to be inadmissible because a motive to misrepresent takes it out
of the class of documents prepared in the "regular course of business",
or whether it is inadmissible based on "bad faith." Some courts use the
latter framework of analysis.36 Other courts adopt the approach of the
Supreme Court in Hoffman and simply find that, even though accident
reports are regularly made, the reports do not fall within the "legal" defi-
nition of the regular course of the business of railroading. Under either
analysis the result should be the same.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1062 (1990).
31. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
32. 457 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. 1990).
33. Id. at 676.
34. Id. at 113.
35. Palmer v. Hoffman, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
36. See Solomon v. Shuell, 457 N.W.2d 669, 677 (Mich. 1990) (noting that "trustworthiness
is itself an express threshold condition of admissibility); United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893,
910 (3rd Cir. 1991) (stating "[o]ur opinion in Furst [laying out the categorical requirements of
Rule 803(6)] does not include trustworthiness in the four specific requirements it lists ....").
[Vol. 48:481
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B. Exclusion of Legal Documents Under Rule 803(6)
For legal documents, the relationship of the parties and the purpose
of the business record determines whether the documents should be
excluded. In United States v. Casoni,37 a co-conspirator made state-
ments to his attorney implicating the defendant. 38 The co-conspirator's
attorney recorded the statements in a memorandum and proffer which
were presented to the government as a bid for the co-conspirator's
immunity.39 The government later sought to have the proffer entered
into evidence in a trial against the defendant.40 The defendant argued
that the attorney had a motive to fabricate the report because, as an
advocate of the co-conspirator, he wanted to minimize his client's crimi-
nal responsibility and maximize that of the other co-defendants. 4'
In denying admission of the proffer, the Third Circuit stated: "[w]e
do not think the proffer of an attorney seeking immunity from criminal
prosecution for his client has the element of trustworthiness that the
business records exception to Rule 803(6) requires."42 The court
expanded upon what it meant by trustworthiness:
[o]ur holding does not imply that a proffer prepared by an attorney in
a bid for his client's immunity is untrustworthy because the attorney
is likely to misrepresent the facts, but only that such an attorney's
narrative prepared for the purpose of securing a bid for immunity
from criminal prosecution for his client is an example of a case in
which the method and circumstances of preparation bear so heavily
on the requirement of trustworthiness that it should not be admitted
under the hearsay exception for statements prepared in the course of
"a regularly conducted business activity. 43
The court held that the proffer was not a "record routinely prepared
in the 'business' of the practice of law" but "instead, a product of the
advocate's craft, consciously shaped to serve a client's end. It is a tool
of controversy, not a routine record of fact."'  If artfully crafted legal
documents do not fall within the course of the "regularly conducted
business activity" of practicing law, one is hard-pressed to imagine what
would.
Casoni highlights the difficulty in applying "bad faith" analysis to
legal documents. Almost all legal documents are created to portray the
37. 950 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1991).
38. Id. at 900.
39. Id. at 901.
40. Id. at 902.
41. Id. at 910.
42. Id. at 912.
43. Id. at 912-13.
44. Id. at 912.
1993]
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client in the most favorable light possible. The very nature of an adver-
sarial legal system renders such a result inevitable.45
The relationship of an attorney to a client gives rise to a presump-
tion that documents prepared by an attorney are meant to portray the
client in the most favorable light. In addition, the purpose of the docu-
ment-in this instance, a proffer meant to secure immunity for the cli-
ent-is much less trustworthy than other types of documents. In
contrast, an internal memorandum would probably be found to contain a
more candid statement of fact.
C. Exclusion of Other Documents Based on Relationship and
Purpose
Other cases have focused on the relationship between the various
parties in the litigation. In Hoffman, the relationship in question was
between an employee and his employer. The fact that the creator of the
report was an employee of a party likely to be involved in a lawsuit,
coupled with the purpose of the document, protection against future liti-
gation, led the court to exclude the accident report.46
Sometimes the purpose of the document itself provides sufficient
basis for exclusion, particularly if the party who created the document
seeks to use it in present litigation. 7 In such a case, the court may
scrutinize the report more thoroughly, especially if the creator admits
that the purpose of the report was to portray that party in a favorable
light. For example, in United States v. Williams,4 8 the Fifth Circuit
excluded a memorandum prepared by the company's head of mainte-
nance that estimated the value of a stolen company trailer.49 The court
noted that the declarant "made the statement almost three years after the
incident in question. It was not made "in the course of a 'regularly con-
ducted business activity' nor was it 'the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum.' " The court concluded that "[a]ll
too clearly, [the declarant] prepared the statement for purposes of the
trial alone."50
45. As one legal scholar notes: "The theory of our adversary system of litigation is that each
litigant is most interested and will be most effective in seeking, discovering, and presenting the
materials which will reveal the strength of his own case and the weakness of his adversary's case
.... .EDMUND M. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF LITIGATION 3, (1956) (emphasis added).
46. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
47. If the document is being used against the person who created it, then the document will
usually not be excluded. Korte v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 191 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951).
48. 661 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1981).




Other cases confirm that courts may exclude a report if it was pre-
pared simply to make the party look good. In Pan-Islamic Trade Corp.
v. Exxon Corp.,5 the court excluded a memorandum prepared by the
plaintiff, although it was not prepared specifically for litigation pur-
poses, its admitted purpose was to portray the plaintiff in the "best light
possible. 52
Conversely, in several instances the court has allowed business
records to be admitted under circumstances that otherwise appear to lack
trustworthiness.53 A report prepared pursuant to a government mandate
may not be subjected to the usual scrutiny even though the report was
obviously prepared for the purpose of litigation.54 Thus, in Abdel v.
United States,55 the court admitted transaction reports prepared by a
Food Stamp Review Officer despite the objection that the reports were
prepared in anticipation of imminent litigation.56 In Abdel, investigative
officers tried to use food stamps to buy non-food items from various
stores. The officers made a record of the items purchased on the trans-
action report immediately after the purchase .5  The court admitted the
report primarily because of the Food and Nutrition Service's mandate to
effectuate the food stamp system.5 8
As a general rule, courts will exclude reports prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation or created to make a party appear in its best light,
unless a government agency is in pursuit of a government mandate. Pre-
dicting which business records courts will exclude as untrustworthy,
however, is difficult. In Casoni, for example, if a financial report rather
than a proffer had implicated the defendant, and the relationship between
the co-conspirator and the attorney instead had been an accountant-client
relationship, that report may not have been excluded. An accountant
will usually prepare reports in a light most favorable to his client, but
strict accounting principles and ethical obligations require accountants'
statements to accurately depict clients' financial positions. If the analy-
sis is based on the purpose of the report alone, the result is even less
clear.
The Advisory Committee recognized the addition of the motiva-
51. 632 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981).
52. Id. at 560.
53. Id.
54. See Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 1977) (admitting a report prepared in
accordance with HUD's statutory mandate).
55. 670 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1982).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 76. This case represents a renegade approach to "bad faith" analysis. As long as the
overall purpose of the declarant is good (i.e. to help poor people acquire adequate nutrition) then
individual statements prepared for enforcement purposes are admissible.
1993]
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tional factor as "a source of difficulty and disagreement. 59 In Hoffman,
Judge Clark said in his dissent, "I submit that there is hardly a grocer's
account book which could not be excluded on [a "bad faith"] basis."6
Commentators have found introduction of the motivational factor dis-
turbing because the fact that business records may be self-serving has
not traditionally been a basis for their exclusion.61
Although the Advisory Committee recognized this dilemma, it con-
cluded that:
[t]he formulation of specific terms which would assure satisfactory
results in all cases is not possible. Consequently the rule proceeds
from the base that records made in the course of a regularly con-
ducted activity will be taken as admissible but subject to authority to
exclude if "the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness."62
Rule 803(6) is not a useful tool for applying "bad faith" analysis
under other hearsay exceptions because the exception is vague, its adop-
tion was highly controversial, and the case law offers no consistent cate-
gorical framework for its application. This suggests the necessity of
rethinking the "lack of trustworthiness" provision in Rule 803(6).
III. RULE 803(8) AND LACK OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
Rule 803(8) provides that public records and reports are excepted
from the rule against hearsay. 63 The most controversial area of the pub-
lic records exception is the evaluative report. The Advisory Commit-
59. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's notes.
60. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 1002 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
61. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note (citing Charles V. Laughlin, Business
Records and the Like, 46 IowA L.REV. 276, 285 (1961)). Professor Laughlin stated: "That
records are self-serving is no objection to admissibility." Laughlin, supra, at 285. He further
stated: "This point is so obvious that little actual authority can be cited." Id. at n.27 (citing
Joseph v. Krull Wholesale Drug Co., 147 F. Supp. 250, 256 n.22 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Estate of
Buchman, 291 P.2d 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); John Scowcroft & Sons Co. v. Roselle, 289 P.2d
621 (Idaho 1955); Smith v. Abel, 316 P.2d 793, 799 (Or. 1957); Istrouma Mercantile Co. v.
Northern Assur. Co., 165 So. 11 (La. 1935)).
62. FED. R. Evm. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
63. The Rule provides:
Public Records and Reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office
or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil
actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (emphasis added).
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tee's note to Rule 803(8) sets out factors for determining the
trustworthiness of evaluative reports: "(1) the timeliness of the investi-
gation; (2) the special skill or experience of the official; (3) whether a
hearing was held and the level at which conducted; (4) possible motiva-
tional problems suggested by Palmer v. Hoffman." 4 The Advisory
Committee also indicated that this list is not exhaustive.65
The motivation factor of the general trustworthiness requirement is
most relevant to this comment's analysis. The Advisory Committee's
note to Rule 803(8) cites Palmer v. Hoffman for the proposition that any
public records prepared in anticipation of litigation are untrustworthy
and may therefore be subject to exclusion.6 6 Several federal cases sup-
port this position.67
A. Documents Created in Anticipation of Litigation Excluded Under
Rule 803(8)
In Attorney General v. John A. Biewer Co.,6" the Michigan Court of
Appeals excluded several Department of Natural Resources memoranda
which set forth the costs that the agency incurred during the investiga-
tion of contamination of ground water by the defendant's plant.69 The
court concluded that the memoranda were prepared by the Department
for the specific purpose of recovering damages in a civil lawsuit.70 Con-
sequently, the court concluded that "[tlhe inherent trustworthiness of
documents prepared by a public official in carrying out his duties which
justifies the public records exception does not apply to this case ' 7'
64. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
65. Id. See also Beach Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) (The Court recognized
that courts may exclude evaluative reports under Rule 403-type relevancy analysis).
66. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note.
67. See United States v. Johnson, 722 F.2d 407, 410 (8th Cir. 1983) (Although the record in
Johnson was admissible the court stated: "[t]he 803(8) exception was designed to allow
admission of official records prepared for purposes independent of specific litigation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stone, 604 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1979). The record at issue here was kept in
ministerial fashion, pursuant to legal authority, and not in anticipation of [litigation]."); Glados,
Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 888 F.2d 1309 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1025 (1990)
(police officer had no stake in litigation therefore document was not prepared in anticipation of
litigation); United States v. Diaz, No. 92-78, 1993 WL 85764, *12 (E.D.Pa. March 25, 1993) (In
Diaz the document was not a public document but the court stated that if it had been it would have
been inadmissible partly because it was prepared in anticipation of litigation); Solomon v. Shuell,
457 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. 1990)(record prepared in anticipation of litigation excluded); Attorney
General v. John Biewer Co., 363 N.W.2d 712 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)(same). But see United States
v. Davis, 826 F. Supp. 617 (D.R.I. 1993) (document not excluded although one of the purposes of
its preparation was litigation).
68. 363 N.W.2d 712, 726 (1985).
69. Id. at 719-20.
70. Id. at 720.
71. Id.
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In Solomon v. Shuell,72 the Supreme Court of Michigan held in a
wrongful death action against the City of Detroit Police Department that
several reports prepared by four subject police officers lacked trustwor-
thiness and were therefore inadmissible." The reports contained the
officers' own statements of the incident as well as reports of conversa-
tions with the other officers involved. 74 The plaintiff argued and the
court agreed that the reports must be excluded on the basis of "bad faith"
because the officers "knew they were the subject of a homicide investi-
gation that could result in criminal prosecution, civil liability, and inter-
departmental discipline" when the reports were prepared."
Alternatively, in Glados, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co. ,76 the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals examined a police accident report for
improper motive in a situation where both of the parties and the subject
matter were unrelated to the police officer in any way. 7 Finding no
improper motive, the court stated that: "as a police investigator, [the
detective] had no stake in any future litigation. '78 Glados implies that if
the declarant of a public record did have stake in any future litigation,
then the public record would be subject to exclusion.79
B. Exclusion of Politically Motivated Documents
Courts may also exclude public records for lack of trustworthiness
if the public record is politically motivated. In Baker v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co.,8° the Eleventh Circuit refused to admit into evidence a
report of a congressional investigation into Firestone tires.8" The plain-
tiff-appellant sought admission of the report to support his claim for
punitive damages.82 The court found that "[tihe subcommittee report
did not contain factual findings necessary to an objective investigation,
but consisted of the rather heated conclusions of a politically motivated
72. 457 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. 1990).
73. Id. at 678.
74. Id. at 673.
75. Id. at 674.
76. 888 F.2d 1309 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1025 (1990).
77. Id. at 1313.
78. Id.; see also Robbins v. Whelan, 653 F.2d 47 (1st Cir.) cert. denied 454 U.S. 1123 (1981);
Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp, 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979);
Vanderpoel v. A-P-A Transport Corp., No. 90-5866, 1992 WL 158426 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1992).
79. But see infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
80. 793 F.2d 1196 (11th Cir. 1986).
81. Id. at 1189. The report at issue was: The Safety of Firestone 500 Steel Belted Radial
Tires, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign




hearing."83 In Anderson v. City of New York,84 a district court refused to
admit a congressional report noting that "it cannot be denied that hear-
ings and subsequent reports are frequently marred by political expedi-
ency and grandstanding."8 The court characterized committee hearings
as a "circus" and stated that they were not conducive to development of
the facts.86
Courts do not limit the political motivation doctrine to reports of
the United States Congress. In Gentile v. County of Suffolk,87 a federal
district court found that a report prepared by a state appointed body
regarding the police department and district attorney supervision of per-
sonnel was subject to attack on the ground that it was motivated by
partisan interests. 88 Although the court found that the Commission was
non-partisan and thus the report was admissible, the case indicates that
courts will apply the political motivation test to lower-level government
bodies.89
Courts may exclude public records for lack of trustworthiness if (1)
the declarant is motivated by the possibility of future litigation; or, (2)
the report was prepared by a politically-motivated body. The applica-
tion of the "bad faith" concept under Rule 803(8), however, has been
inconsistent in both the political motive area as well as the anticipation
of litigation areas.
A federal district court in In Re Air Crash Disaster at Staptelton
Airport, Denver, Colorado on November 15, 198790 held that: "the fact
that the agency preparing the report has, as a whole, an interest in its
conclusions goes to weight, not admissibility, absent specific evidence
of bias."'"
The general trustworthiness rule is also contradicted in the prepara-
tion in anticipation of litigation area. In Perrin v. Anderson,92 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a report from the Shooting Review
Board under the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety was admissible
despite the fact that the board was comprised of police officers.93 In
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. 657 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
85. Id. at 1579.
86. Id.; but see In Re Air Crash Disaster at Staptelton Airport, Denver, Colorado on
November 15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Cal. 1989).
87. 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
88. Id. at 457.
89. Id.
90. 720 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Col. 1989).
91. Id. at 1498.
92. 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986).
93. Id. at 1047.
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Diaz v. United States,94 a district court held that an incident report pre-
pared by the government and offered on its behalf was admissible in a
negligence action by an invitee, against the United States and a private
party. Diaz flies in the face of Palmer v. Hoffman. The court stated that
JAG reports (reports prepared in accordance with the Judge Advocate
General's Manual), are routinely prepared as a candid recitation of the
facts involved in a particular incident. The court found that the JAG
reports were highly trustworthy because they are prepared under military
standards. This case is also contrary to the Biewer case, which excluded
a Department of Natural Resources memorandum. In both cases gov-
ernment agencies created reports to document events that had a strong
potential for litigation. However, in Diaz the report was admitted and in
Biewer it was not.
As with Rule 803(6), Rule 803(8) offers little in the way of a con-
sistent categorical framework of analysis. Hence its usefulness is lim-
ited in analyzing "bad faith" as applied to other rules. Both Rules
803(6) and 803(8) seemingly serve as warning beacons of the difficulties
in applying inconsistent principles to the exclusion of self-serving
documents.
IV. "BAD FAITH" UNDER THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION
Courts have also addressed motivational considerations in the con-
text of excited utterances. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) excludes
excited utterances from the rule against hearsay.95 Although federal
courts have not applied lack of trustworthiness analysis in applying the
excited utterance exception, some state courts have.96
The Illinois rule of evidence dealing with spontaneous declarations
requires that there be: "(1) an occurrence sufficiently startling so as to
produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) an absence of
time to fabricate; and (3) a statement that relates to the circumstances of
the occurrence." 97 As the following discussion indicates, the Illinois
courts have extended the absence of "time to fabricate" requirement to a
requirement that there be no "motive to fabricate." This extends the
strong policy consideration of requiring an absence of time between a
startling event and a statement to an unsupported qualification of
absence of motive to fabricate.
94. 655 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Va. 1987).
95. FED. R. EvID 803(2) provides: "Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the excitement caused by the event or
condition."
96. See infra text accompanying notes 97-118.
97. People v. Poland, 174 N.E.2d 804, 807 (II. 1961); People v. Robertson, 356 N.E.2d 1180,
1183 (I11. App. Ct. 1976).
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In People v. Parisie,98 an Illinois Fourth District Court of Appeal
made such an extension. It held that when considering whether the
excitement predominated over the statement the court may consider the
nature of the event, the condition of the declarant, the influence of inter-
vening occurrences, and the presence or absence of self-interest.99
Courts have often considered lack of motive to fabricate in child
sex abuse cases. In In re Marriage of Theis,"° the court stated, "Illinois
courts have recognized the special circumstances which exist concerning
the motivations behind the statements of very young children. The
rationale for the admission of their statements is that it is unlikely that a
child of tender years will have any reason to fabricate stories of
attacks."' 01
Courts have also used the theory of lack of motive to fabricate in
other contexts. In People v. Gacho,'t 2 the declarant, while suffering
from multiple gunshot wounds and severe blood loss, was confined for
six and one half hours in a car trunk with a dead man on a cold Decem-
ber night.1 3 When the trunk was opened by police and paramedics, a
police officer asked, "Who did this to you?' ' "° The declarant, in pain
and having difficulty breathing, responded "Gott or Gotch."'' 5 In hold-
ing the identification admissible the court said that "[w]e believe it is
inconceivable, as the trial court ruled, that [the victim] would have spent
the time under these conditions to attempt to fabricate a story or state-
ment about the event."'
' 0 6
In People v. House,1° 7 the victim/declarant was severely burned in
a violent attack.'08 Hours later, at the hospital, she gave a description of
her assailants to police officers."o Defense counsel sought to introduce
the statement because the description did not match that of the defend-
ant, but the trial court denied admission." 0 The Supreme Court of Illi-
nois, however, reversed the trial court citing and quoting from Gacho:
"Neither [victim/declaranti had a motive to fabricate. Quite the con-
trary, both would have every reason to see their assailants brought to
98. 287 N.E.2d 310 (I11. App. Ct. 1972).
99. Id. at 322-23 (citing State v. Stafford, 23 N.W.2d 832, 835-36 (Iowa 1946)).
100. 460 N.E.2d 912 (II1. App. Ct. 1984).
101. id. at 917; see also People v. Chatman, 441 N.E.2d 1292, 1298 (I11. App. Ct. 1984).
102. 522 N.E.2d 1146 (I11. 1988).
103. Id. at 1150.
104. Id. at 1151.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1156.
107. 566 N.E.2d 259 (Ill. 1990).
108. Id. at 261.
109. Id. at 261-62.
110. Id. at 270.
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justice."' II The court therefore admitted the statement.
The Illinois courts have even admitted hearsay statements where
the declarant had a motive to fabricate. In People v. Watson,"2 the
defendant was convicted of sexually abusing the declarant, a three-year-
old girl."13 The defendant claimed that the girl was trying to climb into
a crib and fell onto a small rocking chair."' The declarant told nurses,
"I didn't fall on the rocking chair.""' 5 Defendant, seeking to have the
statement excluded as "bad faith" hearsay, argued that the declarant had
been told repeatedly not to climb on the chair and that she therefore had
a motive to fabricate the statement." 6 The court, however, allowed the
statement, finding that the "credibility of a child of such tender years
would be a matter for the jury to weigh."' 17 This approach allowed the
court to determine the admissibility under the hearsay exception and the
jury to determine its weight.
If courts can consider self-interest, what level of self interest will
serve to demonstrate that the statement is not an excited utterance and
when will they simply allow the "bad faith" component to be weighed
by the jury as matter of credibility? Moreover, should the need for con-
sistency in decision-making and uniform application of the categorical
framework of the hearsay rule dictate that the "bad faith" component
always be a matter for the finder of fact when weighing credibility? The
following example illustrates the difficulty in applying "bad faith" anal-
ysis under Rule 803(2).
Assume that after a car accident, the declarant exclaims, "Oh my
God, the pink car [the defendant's] ran the red light." Now assume that
the defendant was the declarant's stock broker and had lost the declar-
ant's money in a bad stock deal. Or, assume that the defendant was
black and the declarant was a member of the Klu Klux Klan, or that the
defendant had an affair with the declarant's wife, or that the declarant
was proven to hate the color pink.
The declarant's statement may manifest varying levels of "bad
faith" which make it difficult to determine what circumstances warrant
attack upon the declarant's credibility and when a judge should step in
and declare as a matter of law the statement should be excluded because
111. Id. at 287; see also Simmons v. Firestone, 467 N.E.2d 327 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (noting
that because of pain, declarant had little time or incentive to fabricate).
112. 438 N.E.2d 453 (I11. App. Ct. 1982).
113. Id. at 455.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 456.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 457.
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it was made in "bad faith."' 18 The same fact pattern, when posed to
various judges, may potentially have varying results under Rule 803(2),
as was the case under Rules 803(6) and 803(8). 1t9
When an exception to the hearsay rule has requirements other than
trustworthiness, a finding of "bad faith" is more easily obscured as a
mere factor in the overall analysis.' 20 The next section demonstrates the
difficulty of analyzing statements under Rule 803(3)-an exception that
lacks strict policy considerations and enumerated requirements and
therefore possesses even fewer circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness than the excited utterance exception.
V. HEARSAY STATEMENTS UNDER RULE 803(3)
Rule 803(3) excepts from the rule against hearsay statements of
then existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions.' 2t The excep-
tion to hearsay under Rule 803(3) encompasses statements such as, "My
leg hurts" or "I love you"'122, but does not apply to a statement such as,
"I felt bad when Johnny threw the ball through the window last
week." ' 23 Rule 803(3) textually excludes the last statement as a recount
of a past emotion or a fact remembered. Allowing such a statement
would eviscerate the rule against hearsay. Thus, the statement may look
forward but not backward.' 24 In addition, statements admitted under
Rule 803(3) may be used to show only the declarant's belief-not the
fact believed.'
25
118. This naturally raises the issue of whether judges rather than juries should be determining
credibility. Because this issue has been adequately discussed elsewhere, this comment does not
address it. Query what does the constitutional right to a jury trial mean? Preservation of judicial
integrity warrants removing "bad faith" analysis from the bench and delegating it to the jury.
119. See supra parts II & III.
120. This was demonstrated by the courts' preference of using the "not prepared in the regular
course of business" framework as opposed to the overall trustworthiness requirement in Rule
803(6) analysis. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1947). See supra note 34 and accompanying
text. Under the excited utterance exception, motivation was only one factor among many. People
v. Parisie, 287 N.E.2d 310, 322-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
121. The Rule provides:
Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant's will.
FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
122. MICHAEL K. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE
REFERENCE TEXT 185 (Patricia C. Bobb et al. eds., 1989).
123. Id. at 191.
124. FED. R. EvID. 803(3) advisory committee's note.
125. If a declarant states "My brakes are bad" his comment is admissible to show that he
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Rule 803(3) contains no provision for exclusion based on lack of
trustworthiness. As discussed supra, the Model Code of Evidence does
contain such a provision. The Advisory Committee, however, purpose-
fully omitted the "bad faith" provision when creating the Federal Rules
of Evidence, because it felt that good or bad faith essentially bears upon
credibility and thus is a matter for the jury. 126 Some courts exclude "bad
faith" statements, using Rule 403.127 Others use a three-prong test
which includes a "bad faith" component when applying Rule 803(3).
Still others refuse to allow exclusion simply because the judge does not
believe the declarant or the witness.
A. Applying "Bad Faith" as a Component of Relevancy Under
Rule 403
Judge Jack Weinstein' 28 states that the "bad faith" component may
be introduced through Rule 403 balancing. 29 Rule 403 weighs the pro-
bative value of evidence against various trial concerns. 130 If the trial
concerns outweigh the probative value of the statement, the statement is
excluded. Judge Weinstein offers that "bad faith" is only one factor that
should be considered in the equation.'
31
The Ninth Circuit adopted Judge Weinstein's approach in United
States v. Miller. 32 In Miller, the defendant made the statement at issue
during a telephone conversation with his wife.' 33 During the conversa-
tion, the defendant described his "confused and distraught" state.' 34 The
court excluded the statement as "unreliable and self-serving."' 35 The
court pointed out that the defendant knew the conversation was being
recorded because he mentioned it during the call.' 36 The Ninth Circuit
determined that "[g]iven the potentially manufactured nature of this evi-
dence, the district court properly recognized that [the statement] was
unreliable and of little probative value."' 37 Furthermore, the court rec-
thought that his brakes were bad. It is not admissible to show that his brakes were in fact bad.
GRAHAM, supra note 17 § 803.3 n.2.
126. See supra note 72, at 803-121.
127. United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).
128. Judge Weinstein is a well noted legal scholar on the law of evidence as well as a District
Court Judge for the Eastern District of New York.
129. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 6, 803(3)[4].
130. FED. R. EviD. 403.
131. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 6, 803(3)[4].
132. 874 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1989).







ognized that the evidence was likely to confuse the jury. 13 8
In evaluating the incremental probative value for the purpose of
determining admissibility under Rule 403, the trial judge must assume
that the statement will be believed by the trier of fact.1 39 This poses a
problem in using a "bad faith" analysis under Rule 403. The application
of another rule of evidence should not serve to circumvent the unambig-
uous intention of the legislature to limit judicial discretion in considera-
tion of "bad faith" when applying Rule 803(3)."4 Thus, Rule 403 is an
improper vehicle for "bad faith" analysis.
B. Exclusion of Self-Serving Statements Under Ponticelli and Its
Progeny
Under Rules 803(6), 803(8), and 803(2), the circumstantial grounds
for possible exclusion of hearsay statements are fairly clear. Under Rule
803(6) the business duty and regularity make reports trustworthy. Under
Rule 803(8) the official duty makes a record trustworthy. Under Rule
803(2) an exciting event is presumed to still the declarant's capacity to
lie. Under Rule 803(3), however, the justification for allowing state-
ments of present mental conditions is simple necessity.' 4' Rule 803(3)
does not condense policy considerations into factors to be used when
applying the rule, such as contemporaneousness to a startling event
under Rule 803(2) or preparation in the regular course of business under
Rule 803(6). As a result, "bad faith" analysis is a strong consideration
for exclusion, if not the only consideration.
The following cases form a framework of analysis similar to that
employed in Rule 803(2) by relating the statements to an event and then
requiring that the statement be made in close proximity to that event,
excluding statements that do not meet that requirement. There is no
such requirement under Rule 803(3), however, that the statement relate
to any event, only that it be a statement of a "present" mental state.
138. Id. at 1266.
139. GRAHAM supra note 122, at 20; see Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1154
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Thompson, 615 F.2d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 1980).
140. See SINGER, supra note 16, § 46.01.
141. GRAHAM, supra note 17 § 803.3. Some courts have tried to sure up this exception and
other hearsay exceptions by requiring corroboration or allowing the statement to be used only
against the party who created it. With regard to Rule 803(6) the Advisory Committee stated: "If a
report is offered by the party at whose instance it was made, however, it has been held
inadmissible." FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note; see Yates v. Blair Transport Inc.,
249 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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1. THE PONTCELLI CASE-THE THREE PRONG TEST-A CRACK IN
THE DAM
In United States v. Ponticelli,42 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that in applying Rule 803(3), the court must evaluate three factors:
contemporaneousness, chance for reflection, and relevance.' 4 3 In Pon-
ticelli, the defendant, Ponticelli, testified before a grand jury that he did
not recall how he came to possess a written list of four names used in a
loan-sharking operation.'" At a second grand jury proceeding, a co-
defendant in the original grand jury investigation agreed to testify that
Ponticelli told him that Ponticelli intended to lie to the grand jury. 45
Subsequently, at trial, the co-defendant testified that he personally gave
Ponticelli the piece of paper with the four names on it.' 46 In the ensuing
prosecution of Ponticelli for perjury concerning his possession of the
list, Ponticelli sought to offer the statement he previously made to his
lawyer that he could not remember where he got the list. The court
excluded the statement. 147 The court concluded that Ponticelli had suffi-
cient time to "concoct" the story about how he came to possess the list,
namely that the F.B.I. planted it there.' 48 The court determined that the
fact that Ponticelli made the statement after his arrest while in consulta-
tion with a lawyer indicated that he appreciated the legal significance of
his statement.' 49 In other words, Ponticelli made the statement in antici-
pation of future litigation.
2. PONTICELLI USED IN EVALUATING OTHER ORAL STATEMENTS
In United States v. Harvey, 50 the government charged the defend-
ant, a self proclaimed "loan broker," with mail and wire fraud.' 5' He
had promised loans from a reliable source but never produced the loans.
At trial, the defendant sought to introduce the statement of a third party
who purportedly heard the defendant state that he believed that his fin-
anciers were "hustlers."' 5 2 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the trial court's exclusion of the statement because it was made two
years after the loans were promised and only the state of mind of the
142. 622 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980).
143. Id. at 991.
144. Id. at 987.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 991.
148. Id. at 988, 992.
149. Id. at 992.
150. 959 F.2d 1371 (7th Cir. 1992).
151. Id. at 1377.
152. Id. at 1375.
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defendant at the time of the alleged mail and wire fraud was relevant.' 53
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found this to be a valid reason for
excluding the statement.1 54 The court, however, went on to apply the
Ponticelli test and required that the statement be made under "circum-
stances showing that the declarant had no time to reflect and perhaps
misrepresent his thoughts."'
' 55
In United States v. Jackson,156 the defendant made an exculpatory
statement regarding a fuel stealing scheme to an informant. The defend-
ant made the statement two years after the fuel stealing scheme had
ended.' 57 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals properly excluded the
statement under the text of Rule 803(3) as a statement of past belief or
fact remembered.' 58 The relevant issue in the case related to criminal
intent at the time of the fuel stealing scheme.' 59 The earlier statement
was relevant only as it related to the belief at the time of the fuel stealing
scheme. But after the court excluded the statement on past belief
grounds, the Seventh Circuit applied the Ponticelli test and found the
statements also failed that test."6
In United States v. Carter,16 1 the defendant sought to introduce his
mother's testimony that while at the police station she heard the defend-
ant say that he had lied to protect his fiance.' 62 The Seventh Circuit held
the statement inadmissible on two grounds.' 6 3 First, it held that the
statement was of memory or belief to prove a fact remembered or
believed.' 6 Second, the court, applying the Ponticelli test, found that
the defendant had an hour to fabricate the statement rendering it
inadmissible. 1
65
3. WRITFEN DOCUMENTS EXCLUDED UNDER PONTICELLI
Some courts have extended the Ponticelli test to include written
documents reflecting mental or emotional conditions among inadmissi-
ble statements. In United States v. Faust, 66 the trial court had excluded
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1377.
155. Id. at 1375.
156. 780 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1986).
157. Id. at 1313.
158. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
159. Jackson, 780 F.2d at 1315.
160. Id.
161. 910 F.2d 1524 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1628 (1990).
162. Id. at 1530.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1531.
166. 850 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988).
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a letter containing exculpatory statements on the grounds that it was
cumulative. 67 After affirming the trial court's ruling, the Ninth Circuit
went on to apply the Ponticelli test. The court ruled that because the
defendant had time to reflect before writing the letter, and because he
evaluated several drafts of the letter, the evidence was unreliable.'68
Similarly, in United States v. Harris,'69 defendants to a prosecution
for income tax evasion sought to introduce a letter written by Kritzak. 70
In the letter Kritzak stated that he loved the defendants and that he
would do all he could to make them happy. 7 ' The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's exclusion of the letters and
held that the letters were not hearsay for the purpose for which they
were introduced.1 72 But, in dicta, the court stated that the letters would
be inadmissible under the Ponticelli test, concluding "[tihe act of letter
writing usually provides as much time as the writer might want to fabri-
cate or misrepresent his thoughts, so this exception [803(3)] does not
apply .... ,,173 These two cases purport to exclude any written statement
that captures a mental condition, plan or motive simply because it was in
writing. Yet Rule 803(3) makes no mention of the exclusion of written
statements. The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that written state-
ments are as communicative as oral statements. 174 Courts have stretched
the "bad faith" analysis to exclude types of hearsay that fall within the
Rule 803(3) exception.
4. PONTICELLI EXPANDED INTO THE CIVIL CONTEXT
Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., expanded the Ponticelli test into the
civil context. 171 In a negligence action under the Jones Act, the plain-
tiff's administratrix sought to offer the statement and written report of
the injured's supervisors as evidence.1 76 The injured party stated that he
had pain and difficulty walking, but the court held that the statement was
not at issue in the case. 177 When the plaintiff sought to offer the accident
report of the supervisors, the court similarly stated that the evidence was
167. Id. at 585.
168. Id. at 586.
169. 942 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1991).
170. Id. at 1130.
171. Id.
172. Id. The defense sought to introduce the letters for the purpose of showing what Harris
believed, not for showing that Kritzak loved Harris. Id.
173. Id. at 1130 n.5.
174. FED. R. EVID. 801.
175. 922 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1991).




inadmissible."' 8 The court first recognized that the evidence constituted
double hearsay and Rule 805 should apply.' 79 Under Rule 805 each
level of hearsay must meet some exception or exemption in order for the
statement to be admissible.' The court stated that the business record
exception was satisfied. On the second level of hearsay, the court stated
that "[e]vidence of [plaintiffs] motive to fabricate such statements cre-
ates too great a risk of inaccuracy or untrustworthiness to provide the
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness contemplated by the hear-
say exceptions."'' 8 1  The court used the Ponticelli language but cited
only generally to the Rule 803 Advisory Committee's Notes, noting no
specific sections.' 82 The Rock court attempts to achieve the best of both
worlds by stating that it "made no determination as to the extent of evi-
dence indicating that Rock, himself, was untrustworthy."'
' 8 3
5. THE DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING THE PONTCELLI TEST
CONSISTENTLY
The problem with the Ponticelli line of cases is the impracticable
analysis employed. In Ponticelli, the court held that in applying Rule
803(3) a court must evaluate three factors: contemporaneousness,
chance for reflection, and relevance. 184 These criteria are created out of
whole cloth.185 Judges cannot use the individual elements of the Pon-
ticelli test as consistent guides in decision making. The first element
cannot always be applied and is not required by Rule 803(3). The sec-
ond element is in direct conflict with the existing rule of evidence.1
8 6
Finally, Rule 403 already addresses the third element.
Under the contemporaneousness requirement of the Ponticelli test,
some "event" must give rise to the declarant's statement, but Rule
178. Id. In excluding the statement, the court concluded that filing accident reports did not
constitute an "integral part" of the injured's usual course of business. Id.
179. Id. at 280.
180. Rule 805 states: "Hearsay within hearsay. Hearsay included within hearsay is not
excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an
exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules." FED. R. EvID. 805.
181. Rock, 922 F.2d at 280.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 281. This statement, however, is inconsistent with the court's finding that his
statement should be excluded.
184. United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 991 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1016
(1980).
185. The court does cite to United States v. Partyka, 561 F.2d 118, 125 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1037 (1978). However, Partyka offers no authority other than Rule 803(3) itself.
Id. at 991. The court cites the Advisory Committee's notes as the only other authority. Id. The
notes provide no such criteria.
186. FED. R. EvID. 803(3). There is direct conflict because the Advisory Committee
purposefully left the "bad faith" provision out of the Rule. See 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 4, 1 803(3)[04], at 803-121.
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803(3) does not require this element. In the case of a statement of emo-
tion, motive, plan, or design, no single underlying event may exist. Fur-
thermore, the event may be so abstract that it is impossible to pinpoint.
The statement "I love Mary", falls under Rule 803(3) as an exception to
the hearsay rule.
187
The declarant's love for Mary may have occurred the first time the
declarant saw Mary or maybe the first time the declarant and Mary had a
date. Or, the declarant may not be able to identify why he loves Mary,
only that he presently does. Isolating specific events that give rise to
human emotions is difficult. Under Rule 803(3), the point in time when
some event giving rise to the feeling took place is immaterial; it matters
only that it is a "present" emotion.
The second requirement of the Ponticelli test mandates that there be
no chance for reflection.' 88 With no identifiable observation, time for
reflection cannot be measured. But this requirement is the key to apply-
ing "bad faith" analysis. Without it, one cannot analyze motive to
fabricate.
The third requirement of the Ponticelli test is relevancy. 89 The
Ponticelli test requires relevancy in the same way as do Rules 402 and
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court must first find rele-
vancy and then minimum probative value which is not outweighed by
substantial prejudice. In Ponticelli, the court finds both elements satis-
fied without citing to Rule 402 or 403.190 Purporting to apply relevancy
as an element in the application of Rule 803(3), however, adds nothing
to our understanding of Rule 803(3); it merely clouds the dispositive
issue-bad faith.
After disposing of the elements of the Ponticelli test as either inap-
plicable or superfluous, all that remains is the solitary "bad faith" analy-
sis. In this context, the judge has the opportunity to form a pure
judgment of the declarant's credibility. This analysis can be rationalized
on the basis that the judge is merely measuring the sincerity risk
involved. However, the Advisory Committee has already adjudged that
the necessity of this type of hearsay requires its admission. In the
absence of a sincerity'risk, this type of statement would not be hearsay
in the first place.191
187. GRAHAM, supra note 123, at 185.
188. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d at 991.
189. Relevancy is not being applied under the Ponticelli test as Judge Weinstein suggested it
be used.
190. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d at 991.
191. Any statement may be false, regardless of whether there is time to calculate a
misstatement. In saying "I love Mary," the declarant may have had reasons to lie and say that he
loved Mary when he did not. He may have wished to marry her togain her fortune.
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Ponticelli and its progeny significantly expand the class of circum-
stances that warrant exclusion under the "bad faith" element of the Pon-
ticelli test, and thereby threaten to eviscerate Rule 803(3) itself. Under
this line of cases, several levels of motivation warrant exclusion on "bad
faith" grounds. First, any statement that is written will be excluded
regardless of the writer's motive. Second, virtually any exculpatory
statement made by a criminal defendant may be subject to exclusion,
and those made after arrest will almost surely be excluded. 92 Third, the
court will exclude any statement that it determines the declarant made to
benefit him in some future litigation.'
93
VI. THE PROBLEM WITH "BAD FAITH" ANALYSIS IN OUR SYSTEM OF
JUSTICE
"Bad faith" analysis under the Ponticelli test is improper because
bare credibility analysis invades the province of the jury by assuming
that the declarant is not credible before the statement is heard.' 94 John
Henry Wigmore maintained that allowing exclusion based on "bad
faith" runs contrary to the most basic notions of fairness.'95 The infer-
ence that the accused has "trumped up" his statement is flawed because
it "[takes] the possible trickery of guilty persons as a ground for exclud-
ing evidence in favor of a person not yet proven guilty. '196 According
to Wigmore, to uphold such an exclusion would be contrary to the pre-
sumption of innocence afforded to the accused.1 97 A privilege which
we:
elaborate ... in painful and quibbling detail; we expend upon it pages
of judicial rhetoric; we further maintain, with sentimental excess, the
privilege against self-crimination; in short, we exhaust the resources
of reasoning and strain the principles of common sense to protect an
accused person against an assumption of guilt until the proof is irre-
192. Empirical studies support this position. See Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work:
Has it Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1992).
193. Professor Swift also documented that civil courts are much more likely to exclude risky
statements made by plaintiffs than defendants. Id. at 486-90.
194. The United States Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2, Clause 3 states: "The trial of all Crimes,
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury ...." The Seventh Amendment provides with
respect to civil cases: "In Suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States ...."
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a) provides: "Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh amendment to the Constitution or as given by a Statute of the United
States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39 provides:
"The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury ...."
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sistible; and yet, at the present point, we throw these fixed principles
to the winds and make this presumption of guilt in the most violent
form.
198
Under Wigmore's approach, the exclusion of hearsay must give
way to our "time-honored formula, [under which] credibility is a matter
of fact for the jury, not a matter of law for the court."' 99
"Bad faith" analysis fails to meet Wigmore's ideals because it
removes the right to allow a jury to make a determination of what testi-
mony is true or false. By doing so, courts decide cases before they hear
them.
VII. RESOLVING THE "BAD FAITH" DILEMMA
"Bad faith" analysis should not present a problem for the courts
from a textual standpoint. A statute should be given its plain meaning.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "the meaning of a statute
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is
framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms.
Rules 803(3) and 803(2) do not require exclusion based on lack of
trustworthiness. Moreover, the presence of the lack of motive to fabri-
cate provision in other sections of Rule 803 indicates that the Advisory
Committee knew how to draft such a provision but purposefully omitted
it from Rules 803(2) and 803(3).201
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a textual approach
to the application of Rule 803(3). In United States v. DiMaria,°2 the
defendant, when approached by federal agents, said, "I thought you guys
were just investigating white collar crime; what are you doing here? I
only came to get some cigarettes real cheap. 2 °3 The defense asserted
that the statement tended to disprove the state of mind required for con-
viction under some of the charges against the defendant.2°  The Assis-
tant United States Attorney argued that the statement was a classic
exculpatory false statement.205 The court responded, "[f]alse it may well
198. Id.
199. James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c)
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 947 (1962).
200. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see also United States v.
Behnezhad, 907 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1990).
201. See United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the
presence of a provision in other parts of the same statute created a presumption that the legislature
meant to exclude it from the subject section).
202. 727 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1984).
203. Id. at 270.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 271.
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have been but if it fell within Rule 803(3), as it clearly did if the words
of that Rule are read to mean what they say, its truth or falsity was for
the jury to determine. ' '2"" This approach ignores the temptation to
employ "bad faith" analysis and relies on the jury to determine whether
the statement is true or false. Other cases have taken a DiMaria
approach as well.20 7
A problem arises when a "bad faith" analysis is read as a part of
Rule 803(3). One possible solution would be to modify the hearsay
exceptions to meet current needs. Congress could clarify the Rules and
take the position that "bad faith" goes only to weight and not to admissi-
bility.2° 8 Both Rules 803(2) and 803(3)209 could be clarified by adding
the following:
Motive to fabricate or "bad faith" of the declarant is not properly
considered when applying this rule. "Bad faith" of the declarant is
206. Id.
207. See Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Arthur, 949 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Cruz v. United States, 498 U.S. 906 (1990); United States v. Detrich, 865 F.2d 17 (2d
Cir. 1988); United States v. Harris, 733 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d
5 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Yu, 697 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Warhurst v. White, 838
S.W.2d 350 (Ark. 1992).
208. A second, yet far less attractive, type of modification could attempt to capture the
elements of the concept of "bad faith." In an analysis of the Ponticelli line of cases, a workable
balancing test may include the following factors: (1) whether the statement is central to the
movant's claim or defense; (2) whether the statement is corroborated in any way; (3) whether the
movant has any other means by which to establish the fact; (4) whether the statement was made by
a criminal defendant in anticipation of criminal prosecution or whether it was made before said
prosecution ensued; (5) whether there is an identifiable event from which a logical nexus between
the event and the statement of the mental or emotional condition can be found, if so was the
statement made contemporaneously with that event; (6) would reasonable jurors, given the
knowledge of the "bad faith" be able to give the evidence its appropriate weight; and, (7) whether
the declarant is so aligned with the movant's interest that the statement should be excluded based
on the other factors.
Under the excited utterance exception a balancing test incorporating the following factors
may compliment the other requirements when "bad faith" is alleged: (1) age of the declarant (2)
whether the declarant has a strong emotional motivation; (3) whether the declarant has a pecuniary
interest that is being furthered by making the statement; (4) whether the declarant had any strong
prior negative disposition towards any of the party's whom the statement disfavors; (5) whether
the declarant has a close personal relationship or duty to provide favorable information to anyone
who is benefiting from the statement; (6) whether the declarant or any party aligned with the
declarant has a stake in litigation that concerned the statement.
Some commentators have suggested that hearsay analysis incorporate a different categorical
framework which would be based on the quantity and quality of the information that the court has
heard concerning the declarant. This would present a different type of modification. See
generally Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L REv. 495 (1987) (categorizing
various hearsay declarants as abstract, risky and burden-shifting declarants).
209. Considering the inconsistency in applying Rules 803(6) and 803(8) a reevaluation to
eliminate the "bad faith" provision may be considered. The fact that Congress added the "bad
faith" element to those rules came as a shock because historically no such provision existed in the
business and public records exception.
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properly considered by the finder of fact when determining weight
and/or truth or falsity of the statement.
This addendum eliminates the need for a more literal application of
the Rule and permits uniformity of admission of hearsay statements
where possible "bad faith" is involved."' 0
VIII. CONCLUSION
Clarifying Rule 803(3) to allow all "bad faith" statements into evi-
dence to be weighed by the jury in their fact-finding deliberations would
serve as the best solution to the "bad faith" dilemma surrounding the
rule. All documents or statements of any kind have some potential for
falsehood. Under Rules 803(6) and 803(8), courts attempt to use the
"anticipation of litigation" framework to exclude documents that they
have a "gut" feeling are untrustworthy. Yet any document could be
excluded on that ground.2" A similar problem occurs in determining
the admissibility of statements under Rules 803(2) and 803(3). There is
no clear reason why one statement is untrustworthy as a matter of law
and another is not.
The weak policy considerations behind some of the hearsay excep-
tions including Rule 803(3), make some judges uneasy about allowing
the jury to consider them. The ensuing result is strictly at odds with the
principles behind the hearsay provisions. Judge Weinstein points out
that the scheme adopted for the hearsay article in the Federal Rules is a
system of class exceptions coupled with open ended provisions in Rules
803(24) and 804(b)(5).21 2 The DiMaria court adds that "this excludes
certain hearsay statements with a high degree of trustworthiness and
admits certain statements with a low one. This evil was doubtless
thought preferable to requiring preliminary determinations of the judge
with respect to trustworthiness, with attendant possibilities of delay, pre-
judgment and encroachment on the province of the jury.
2 13
Although the system of categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule
may seem uneven when applied and perhaps prejudicial in allowing par-
ties to enter exculpatory statements, the statements should be admitted.
The legislature and the Advisory Committee, which have the power to
210. The purpose of this comment is not to suggest recategorization of the existing hearsay
exceptions, nor to deconstruct those exceptions and further define the possible subcategories that
may fall under the existing hearsay exceptions; rather the focus is to point out that judicial
recategorization and redefinition of the rules has created a conflict and cannot be the proper
solution because it has led to an unpredictable and therefore undesirable system of justice. The
same case may have a vastly different outcome depending on the circuit in which it is tried.
211. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 1002 (2d Cir. 1942) (Clark, J., dissenting).
212. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 6, 800[02], at 800-13.
213. United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265 272 (2d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
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change the rules, should modify Rules 803(2) and 803(3)214 to ensure
that it is the fact-finders who determine what is or is not a "bad faith"
self-serving statement.
PETER F. VALORI
214. Based on the foregoing analysis of Rules 803(6) and 803(8), a reconsideration of the
inclusion of the "lack of trustworthiness" provision may be appropriate.
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